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Abstract For today’s organisations, having a reliable
information system is crucial to safeguard enterprise reve-
nues (think of on-line banking, reservations for e-tickets etc.).
Such a system must often offer high guarantees in terms of its
availability; in other words, to guarantee business continuity,
IT systems can afford very little downtime. Unfortunately,
making an assessment of IT availability risks is difficult: inci-
dents affecting the availability of a marginal component of
the system may propagate in unexpected ways to other more
essential components that functionally depend on them. Gen-
eral-purpose risk assessment (RA) methods do not provide
technical solutions to deal with this problem. In this paper
we present the qualitative time dependency (QualTD) model
and technique, which is meant to be employed together with
standard RA methods for the qualitative assessment of avail-
ability risks based on the propagation of availability incidents
in an IT architecture. The QualTD model is based on our
previous quantitative time dependency (TD) model (Zam-
bon et al. in BDIM ’07: Second IEEE/IFIP international
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workshop on business-driven IT management. IEEE
Computer Society Press, pp 75–83, 2007), but provides more
flexible modelling capabilities for the target of assessment.
Furthermore, the previous model required quantitative data
which is often too costly to acquire, whereas QualTD applies
only qualitative scales, making it more applicable to indus-
trial practice. We validate our model and technique in a real-
world case by performing a risk assessment on the authen-
tication and authorisation system of a large multinational
company and by evaluating the results with respect to the
goals of the stakeholders of the system. We also perform a
review of the most popular standard RA methods and discuss
which type of method can be combined with our technique.
Keywords Information risk management ·
Risk assessment · Availability · Information security ·
System modelling
1 Introduction
Among the three main security properties of information,
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA), the impor-
tance of availability (defined as: ensuring that authorised
users have access to information and associated assets when
required [18]) grows as organisations are increasingly depen-
dent on their information systems (on-line banking, reser-
vations for e-tickets etc.) [23]. As a consequence of this,
disruptions in the IT infrastructure often leads to monetary
loss. This fact is confirmed by the increasing importance that
service level agreements (SLAs) are gaining: SLAs are con-
sidered one of the fundamental ways to define and control
the expected availability and quality of a given service and
are widely used not only between different organisations but
also among units of the same company. It is therefore not
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surprising that the mitigation of availability risks (i.e., the
risks that affect the availability of the target of assessment)
receives attention from the business and the research com-
munities [34,41,44].
In general, IT risk assessment (RA) is the first and most
critical phase of IT risk management (RM). During the RA
one determines risks related to (recognised) threats and vul-
nerabilities. Proper RA also ensures that IT risks in the
organisation are audited and dealt with in a structured and
transparent way.
Among the security risks an organisation faces, availabil-
ity risks are often particularly important and difficult to assess
with ordinary techniques. For instance, incidents affecting
the availability of a marginal component of the system may
propagate in unexpected ways to other more essential compo-
nents that functionally depend on them. These dependencies
among components are essential to assess availability risks
and are difficult to consider without the use of dedicated tech-
niques. Unfortunately, general techniques that could be used
to assess availability risks (e.g., FTA or Attack Graphs) are
too expensive in terms of time and required resources [22]
to be adopted in most RAs. In fact, IT RAs are often carried
out based on the intuition and expertise of the auditor and
give little guarantee in terms of objectivity and replicability
of the results.
This is the general problem we tackle in this paper: defin-
ing a technique for assessing availability risks which is simple
enough to be included in a real RA, while at the same time
providing solid guarantees in terms of accuracy and replica-
bility of the results it delivers.
The concrete problem that leads to the definition of the
above general problem statement regards a large multina-
tional company and the method the company uses to assess
availability risks. While it is satisfied with the fact that using
the present RA method they can perform RAs in time, the
company aims at improving their RAs by assessing risks
more precisely and reducing the dependency of the results
on the personnel carrying out the RA (i.e., when determining
the impact level of a threat). At the same time, the company
wants to keep the method feasible in terms of both the amount
and the detail level of the information required and of the time
and resources needed to carry out an RA. In other words,
any improvement of their current RA method and techniques
should not require information that the team carrying out the
RA cannot obtain and should ensure that the results of the
RA can still be delivered on time to the requester. The natural
choice to achieve these goals is to decompose the risk into its
constituting factors such that the following two requirements
are met:
(a) the decomposition is objective, i.e., has a true relation-
ship with the complex risk to be assessed;
(b) data can be collected cost-effectively.
To solve this problem, in this paper we introduce the qual-
itative time dependency (QualTD) model and the technique
associated with it. The QualTD model and technique allow
one to carry out a qualitative assessment of availability risks
based on the propagation of availability incidents in an IT
architecture. Incident propagation is used to increase the
accuracy of incident impact estimation. Likelihood estima-
tion is not specifically addressed by our technique, but can be
based on existing likelihood estimation models (see Sect. 2
for details).
To model the assessed system, we use a graph in which
system components are represented by nodes, and the func-
tional dependencies (along with time constraints) are repre-
sented by edges between nodes. Dependencies are derived
from the IT system architecture. Most of the information
can be found in the system specification/development docu-
mentation, which keeps the extra work required to use this
technique to an acceptable minimum.
In order to evaluate the technique based on the QualTD
model we
1. carry out an assessment of the availability risks on the
global identity and authentication management system of
the company (an availability-critical system) by follow-
ing the company RA method together with the QualTD
model to assess the impact of the threats and vulnera-
bilities present in the system, from now on we call this
assessment R A2;
2. compare the results on the impact estimation obtained
from R A2 with the results produced during a previous
assessment carried out by the company using their inter-
nal RA method only, from now on R A1 (to this end, we
used the likelihood estimates from R A1 to ensure that
the results of the two RAs could be comparable);
3. identify some general factors that justify the adoption of
our technique also in other cases based on the results of
point (2);
4. indicate how to generalise the approach we followed in
the present case to other assessments, carried out follow-
ing other popular (standard) RA/RM methods; and
5. provide a brief review of other RA techniques based on
dependency graphs which we found in the literature, and
we discuss the results they deliver and their applicability
to the present RA case.
Our results indicate that
1. the technique using the QualTD model satisfies require-
ment (b), i.e., it is feasible to embed the QualTD model
with the company’s RA method without requiring too
much time or unavailable information;
2. the QualTD model constitutes an improvement towards
requirement (a), i.e., according to the RA team of the
123
Model-based qualitative risk assessment
company, the technique using the QualTD model deliv-
ers better results in terms of accuracy (due to a more
accurate impact estimation) and helps delivering more
inter-subjective results (i.e., less dependent on the per-
sonnel carrying out the RA);
3. other RA techniques based on dependency graphs [2,10,
13,20] do not satisfy requirement (b), i.e., they could not
be applied to the present case, due to the fact that they
require information that is unavailable or that requires
too much time to be extracted.
4. the QualTD model can be used in combination with
other existing standard methods, under some conditions,
which include (1) the information available is enough
to apply the QualTD model and (2) the compatibility of
the target method with some key features of the QualTD
model.
The last point deserves an additional explanation. A con-
cern one has when introducing a new technique for assess-
ing specific risks is whether this technique fits within more
high-level RA methods. Intuitively speaking, a general (say
company-wide) RA is usually carried out following a (high-
level) method and a number of specific techniques. The high-
level method specifies the global lines to set up the RA
process and to embed it into the organisation. Examples
of RA methods include CRAMM [36], IT-Grundshutz [40],
OCTAVE [32] or the NIST SP 800-30 [27]; a more complete
list can be found in Sect. 5.1. The RA method usually includes
a number of tasks (like evaluating the availability risks), and
does not fully specify how to implement them within a spe-
cific organisation. This gives organisations the flexibility of
choosing an appropriate technique. Techniques include Fault
and Event Tree Analysis [28], Attack Graphs [26] or Haz-
OP [6]. Our contribution can be seen as a technique to assess
availability risks. To establish to which extent the QualTD
model can be embedded in present popular RA methods, we
have made a taxonomy of them and pointed out the con-
ditions that need to be satisfied for this embedding to be
successful.
In our previous work we presented the time dependency
(TD) model [31], which is meant to be used to analyse and
evaluate availability risks in a quantitative way. Differently
from qualitative risk assessments, in quantitative risk assess-
ments likelihoods are represented by numeric frequencies
or probabilities and impact is numeric and represents, e.g.,
money. The magnitude of the difference between risk val-
ues is therefore known. The TD model is based on the same
general principle the QualTD model is based on, i.e., using
the architecture to model time constraints and the functional
dependencies among the components of the IT system. If
provided with the expected frequency and the monetary loss
associated with the system component disruption, the TD
model allows one to calculate the risk associated with an
incident as the average loss expectancy, and to rank inci-
dents accordingly. Also, based on the incident average loss
expectancy and on the cost of available mitigating controls,
it allows one to select the subset of the available controls that
mitigate the loss due to availability incidents at the lowest
possible price. However, the TD model has a number of limi-
tations that make it unsuitable to be used as a general-purpose
RA technique: (1) being quantitative it requires information
that in many industrial organisations can be difficult to obtain
(e.g., incident probability or expected frequency): this makes
it not compliant with requirement (b), (2) it assumes that if
one component fails, all the components depending on it will
automatically fail, which may not be the case when redun-
dancy measures are in place, and (3) it assumes the incidents
that can affect the target of assessment is already known by
the risk assessor.
The QualTD model is more geared to industrial practice
than the TD model, since it is fully qualitative and does not
require information which is hard to gather: therefore, it over-
comes limitation (1) of our previous TD model. To make the
QualTD model qualitative we determine the impact and risk
of availability incidents when the estimates about the like-
lihood of threats and vulnerabilities, the incident duration
and the importance of the business functions supported by
the analysed IT system are expressed by values in an ordinal
scale. In an ordinal scale, only ordering among values are
known (e.g., High > Medium > Low). The QualTD model
also solves limitation (2) by introducing AND /OR depen-
dencies to specify with more flexibility the behaviour of a
component on the components it depends on when they fail.
To solve limitation (3), we provide in this paper a framework
to link threats and vulnerabilities with the components of the
IT system under assessment and derive a list of incidents,
thus increasing the usability of our model and technique.
This paper is structured as follows: in Sect. 2 we formally
present the QualTD model and we explain how it works by
means of a running example. In Sect. 3 we first introduce the
industrial context in which we tested the QualTD model and
then we present the technique we used to apply the QualTD
model to this industrial case. In Sect. 4 we describe the design,
the criteria and the assumptions we made to evaluate the
QualTD model and technique, and we present the evaluation
results. In Sect. 5 we first discuss the applicability of our
technique in combination with standard RA/RM methods,
and then we compare our technique with other dependency-
based RA techniques in the literature. Finally, in Sect. 6 we
draw the conclusions of the paper.
2 The qualitative time dependency (QualTD) model
We now introduce the model supporting our RA technique.
To illustrate the ideas we provide a running example showing
how the QualTD model can be employed in practice.
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Fig. 1 UML class diagram of the QualTD model. In the diagram, the type name of the attributes (criticality, likelihood, downtime, survival time,
dependency type) is referred to by their initial letter only
The QualTD model represents the system target of the
assessment (ToA) by means of a graph in which nodes can
be system components, services or processes supported by
the system, and dependencies among nodes are the edges of
the graph. Incidents that can affect the ToA are the results of
a combination of threats and vulnerabilities and affect one
or more nodes in the graph. So, for example, a threat can be
a denial of service, a vulnerability can be a buffer overflow
and an incident a denial of service on a specific application
carried out by exploiting the buffer overflow vulnerability.
The effects of an incident can propagate to another system
component, service or process following the dependencies in
the ToA. The model allows us to compute the global impact
and the risk levels of the availability incidents hitting the ToA
in the way we are about to explain. Figure 1 summarises the
main concepts of the QualTD model: for each one of them
we will provide a more detailed description in the sequel.
Nodes and edges are the constituents of a dependency graph.
In turn, a node represents an asset constituting the IT architec-
ture, and it is modelled as a generalisation of IT components
(e.g., network components, servers, applications) and IT ser-
vices or processes, which can have a certain criticality for the
organisation’s business. Threats can materialise on IT com-
ponents (with a certain likelihood). IT components can (with
a certain likelihood) have vulnerabilities. Our definitions of
threats and vulnerabilities are similar to the ones given in BS
7799-3 [5]. A combination of a threat and a vulnerability on
a specific set of IT components constitutes a security event
(see BS 7799-3), which we call incident, and can have a cer-
tain duration. Note that BS 7799-3 defines an incident as a
security event with good probability of damaging the orga-
nisation’s business. According to this definition, an incident
would be a combination of a threat and a vulnerability on a
specific set of IT components which have a good likelihood
and impact. For the sake of the presentation, we do not report
in the diagram the concepts of incident harm and risk, as well
as incident risk aggregated by threat/vulnerability, as they are
complex concepts which are produced as the output of the
model.
We split the presentation of the model according to the
three phases of an RA the model supports: (1) definition of
the ToA, (2) risk identification and (3) risk evaluation. To
simplify the exposition we use the following sets to indi-
cate domains: T is the set of all the time interval lengths
(expressed in minutes), E is the set of all the possible depen-
dency (edge) types and it is defined as E = {AND , OR },
D is the set of all the qualitative values expressing duration
(e.g., Short, Long), L is the set of all the qualitative values
expressing likelihood (e.g., Likely, Unlikely), C is the
set of all the qualitative values expressing business value/crit-
icality of an asset (e.g., Critical, Unimportant), H is
the set of all the qualitative values expressing business harm
(e.g., Severe, Negligible) and R is the set of all the
qualitative values expressing the risk (e.g., High, Low).
2.1 Definition of the ToA
We model the ToA by means of an AND /OR graph
which represents the components of the ToA and their func-
tional/technical and organisational dependencies.
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Fig. 2 The dependency graph representing the ToA in our running
example. Nodes are the constituents of the (partial) IT infrastructure
under exam. Services are annotated with their criticality level for the
organisation. The figure also includes the vulnerabilities and threats
which we will formally introduce later in this section and specifically
describe in the running example
Definition 1 (Dependency graph) A dependency graph is
a pair 〈N , E〉 where N is a set of nodes representing the
constituents of the ToA, and E is a set of edges between
nodes E ⊆ {〈u, v, dept, st〉 | u, v ∈ N , dept ∈ E and
st ∈ T }.
Running example: Part 1 The ToA in this example is the
portion of the IT infrastructure of an organisation providing
two IT services: eHoliday, the holiday reservation service
for the employees of the organisation and CRM-Repos-
itory, the organisations Customer Relationship Man-
agement (CRM) repository service. These services are
implemented by means of three applications: WS1, a web
server, DB1 and DB2, two databases. DB1 and DB2 contain
replicas of the CRM data, but only DB1 is used by WS1 as a
repository for eHoliday. Applications are running on two
different servers: Server1 and Server2. eHoliday is
implemented by WS1 and DB1 and, if only one of them is off-
line, the service will be off-line as well.CRM-Repository
is implemented by DB1 and DB2, but both applications must
be off-line for the service to be unavailable.WS1 and DB1 run
on Server1, while DB2 runs on Server2. According to
this description, we build the dependency graph g = 〈N , E〉
as follows:
N = {eHoliday,CRM-Repository,WS1,DB1,DB2,
Server1,Server2}, and
E = { 〈Server1,WS1, AND , 0〉, 〈Server1,DB1,
AND , 0〉, 〈Server2,DB2, AND , 0〉, 〈WS1,eHoliday,
AND , 0〉,
〈DB1,eHoliday, AND , 0〉, 〈DB1,CRM-Repository,
OR , 0〉, 〈DB2,CRM-Repository, OR , 0〉 }.
Figure 2 shows the dependency graph of this running
example.
The nodes N of the graph are the constituents of an IT
architecture, e.g., IT services, applications, servers, network
components and locations, together with the business pro-
cesses the IT supports. Different IT components can be rep-
resented by means of a single node in the graph, according
to the abstraction level required by the RA. For example, in a
company-wide assessment we could represent an IT service
(i.e., a set of servers and all the applications running on them)
by means of a single node, while for the assessment of a spe-
cific IT system we model each component as an individual
node.
An edge from node b to node a indicates that a depends
on b. The graph supports both AND and OR dependencies.
In the former case this means that a becomes unavailable
when any node it depends on is disrupted. In the latter case,
a becomes unavailable when all nodes it depends on are dis-
rupted. Each edge is also annotated with the survival time
(st), which indicates the amount of time v can continue to
operate after u is disrupted.
If a node a has an AND dependency on nodes b and c
and an OR dependency on nodes d and e at the same time,
we read this as a having an AND dependency on nodes b, c
and x , with x having an OR dependency on nodes d and e.
Similarly, the survival time of node a with respect to nodes
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Fig. 3 Equivalence of a graph with mixed AND and OR dependencies
d and e becomes the survival time of node x with respect to
d and e, and the survival time of node a with respect to x is
set to zero. This concept is shown in Fig. 3.
To complete the description of the ToA we include in the
model an estimate of the criticality of the business processes
and of the IT services in the perspective of the RA requester.
Definition 2 (Process/Service criticality) Given a depen-
dency graph g = 〈N , E〉, the criticality of a process/service
is a mapping criticality : N → C .
Running example: Part 2 According to the business units of
the organisation using the IT system, the criticality level of
eHoliday and CRM-Repository is, respectively, Low
and High.
Criticality is defined only for those nodes which represent
IT services or business processes. It expresses the damage
the company suffers if the node becomes unavailable. For
example, in a production company, an IT service supporting
a production line, which is a core business function, has a
higher criticality than, e.g., personal e-mail for employees.
2.2 Risk identification
After modelling the ToA, we identify the vulnerabilities
which are present on it, as well as the threats which could
materialise on it, in particular the ones that compromise its
availability.
Definition 3 (Threat) Given a dependency graph g =
〈N , E〉, a threat is a potential cause of an incident, that may
harm one or more nodes of g. We call T the set of all the
threats to the ToA.
Running example: Part 3 For the sake of simplicity, here we
identify two threats to the ToA: a Power outage can bring
the servers off-line and a Denial of Service (DoS) attack can
cause the unavailability of the applications. Our set of threats
is therefore T = {Power outage,DoS}.
This is a common definition of threat, similar to that given
in BS7799-3 [5]; moreover, it is fully compatible with the
concept of threat the Company has adopted in its internal
RA method. The set of threats T our model addresses are
only the ones which have an impact on the availability of the
ToA.
Definition 4 (Vulnerability) Given a dependency graph g =
〈N , E〉, and the set of threats T , a vulnerability is a weakness
of a node (or group of nodes) in N that can be exploited by
one or more threats in T . We call V the set of vulnerabilities
on the ToA.
Running example: Part 4 We identify two vulnerabilities
which can be present on the nodes of the ToA: Server1
does not have an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) unit
for power continuity in case of outage; moreover, DB1
and DB2 may crash after a buffer overflow attack. Our
set of vulnerabilities is therefore V = {No UPS,Buffer
overflow}.
Also in this case, our definition of vulnerability is consis-
tent with both the definition given in RA standards, and with
the concept of vulnerability the Company has adopted in its
internal RA method.
We model an incident as a security event (as defined in
BS7799-3 [5]) caused by a specific threat on a particular
component of the IT architecture by exploiting a specific vul-
nerability. Differently from the definition of incident given
in BS7799-3, we consider as incidents all security events, not
only events “that have a significant probability of compro-
mising business operations”.
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Definition 5 (Incident) Given a dependency graph g =
〈N , E〉, a set of threats T and a set of vulnerabilities V ,
an incident i is a 3-uple 〈M, t, v〉 with M ⊆ N , t ∈ T and
v ∈ V , describing the combination of three events:
1. v is a vulnerability of each node n ∈ M
2. t is the cause of i on each node n ∈ M
3. t exploits v
We call I the set of all incidents generated from g, T and V .
Moreover, we say a node n is directly affected by an incident
i = 〈M, t, v〉 if n ∈ M .
Running example: Part 5 By combining g, T and V we
identify four incidents that can hit the ToA: (i1) A power
outage causes Server1 to stop because there is no UPS,
(i2) a DoS attack is performed on DB1 by exploiting the
buffer overflow vulnerability, (i3) a DoS attack is performed
on DB2 by exploiting the buffer overflow vulnerability, and
(i4) a DoS attack is performed both on DB1 and DB2 by
exploiting the buffer overflow vulnerability. Our set of inci-
dents is therefore I = {i1, i2, i3, i4} where
i1 = 〈{Server1},Power outage,No UPS〉, i2 =
〈{DB1},DoS,Buffer overflow〉,
i3 = 〈{DB2},DoS,Buffer overflow〉, i4 = 〈{DB1,
DB2},DoS,Buffer overflow〉.
The last concept we introduce for risk identification is
incident propagation.
Definition 6 (Incident propagation) Given a dependency
graph g = 〈N , E〉 and an incident i = 〈M, t, v〉, we say
that i can propagate to a node n ∈ N if
1. n ∈ M , or
2. ∃e ∈ E | e = 〈m, n, AND , st〉 and i propagates to m, or
3. ∀e ∈ E | e = 〈m, n, OR , st〉, i propagates to m.
Running example: Part 6 We want to know if the incident
i1 =〈{Server1},Power outage,No UPS〉 propagates
to eHoliday. Although eHoliday is not directly affected
by the incident, it depends on WS1 and DB1, which in turn
depend on Server1. Server1 is directly affected by the
incident; therefore, we know that i1 will propagate to eHol-
iday.
Definition 7 (Nodes affected by the propagation of an inci-
dent) Given a dependency graph g = 〈N , E〉 and an incident
i = 〈M, t, v〉, Propi = {n ∈ N | i propagates to n}.
Running example: Part 7 According to Definition 7, the set
of nodes affected by the incident i1 = 〈{Server1},
Power outage,No UPS〉 is Propi = {Server1,WS1,
DB1,eHoliday }.
Note that, while the definitions of Threat, Vulnerabil-
ity and Incident we give in this section could be generally
used for confidentiality, integrity and availability, the def-
inition of incident propagation is specific to availability. In
fact, an availability incident propagates on the IT architecture
because of the technical/functional and organisational depen-
dencies that connect the constituents of the architecture. For
example, a power outage on a datacentre will result in some
servers being unavailable, as well as the applications run-
ning on these servers. This disruption causes the IT services
depending on the disrupted applications to become unavail-
able in turn, and propagates from servers to the (key) business
processes supported by the IT services. On the other hand,
even if a confidentiality or integrity incident may propagate
through the IT architecture following the same path, this is
not always the case. For example, if the confidentiality of
a network is compromised because someone is eavesdrop-
ping data that are carried by the network, this does not imply
that the confidentiality of the applications using that network
(and thus connected to it in the dependency graph) is com-
promised, as they may use encrypted traffic (and this feature
is not represented in the graph). Therefore, our model is spe-
cific to availability only.
2.3 Risk evaluation
The last piece of information we include in the model regards
likelihood and duration of incidents. In more detail, a threat
is characterised by two indicators: (1) the threat likelihood
and (2) the time needed to solve the disruption caused by the
threat, e.g., a Short or Long disruption, or even more than
two disruption lengths.
Definition 8 (Threat likelihood) Given the set of threats T ,
the threat likelihood is a mapping t-likelihood : T → L .
Running example: Part 8 Security analysts have assigned a
likelihood to the threats in T using the following scale:
Very Likely, Likely and Unlikely. The likelihood
of Power outage is Unlikely and the likelihood of
DoS is Likely.
The likelihood of a threat is an estimate of the probability
of the threat materialising on the ToA. Here, we have made
the (simplifying) assumption that the likelihood of a threat is
a property of the threat itself, and it is independent from the
IT component the threat occurs on. The assumption holds for
most of the threats, but not for targeted attacks (i.e., attacks
crafted for and directed to a specific IT component), since
the likelihood of the attack is influenced by the value of the
targeted component. In this case we split the threat into a
number of new threats, each of them representing a specific
IT component being targeted.
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It is common practice in qualitative RAs to assess the like-
lihood of threats by means of so-called likelihood models.
Each model combines different parameters, e.g., difficulty of
the attack, resources needed, etc. to determine the final like-
lihood of a threat. However, it is out of the scope of this work
to specify such a model. In the literature there exist works
proposing models for specific contexts (e.g., eTVRA [25] for
telco networks).
Definition 9 (Incident duration) Given a dependency graph
g = 〈N , E〉 and a set of incidents I , the incident duration is
a mapping dt : I × N → D .
Running example: Part 9 According to the stakeholders of
the IT system, an incident is classified as a Long disrup-
tion if it takes more than 3 h to be repaired, as a Short one
otherwise. The contract signed with the power company guar-
antees that a power disruption is repaired on average in 6 h.
Therefore, i1 is classified as a Long disruption. Since restor-
ing DB1 or DB2 after they crashed only requires a restart,
incidents i2, i3 and i4 are classified as Short disruptions.
dt(i,n) is an estimate of the (average) time a node n is out of
service when incident i occurs. If we consider, for example,
a buffer overflow attack which causes the stop of an appli-
cation, the disruption time is the time needed to detect that
the application is no longer running and to restart it. We do
not take into account the time needed to fix the vulnerability
exploited by the threat (e.g., the time to patch the system),
unless this activity is needed to restore the functionalities of
the system. To keep the model qualitative, and to match the
Company method, we apply a discretisation of the disrup-
tion time in terms of short disruption (i.e., shorter than
a given threshold) and long disruption (i.e., longer than a
given threshold), which constitute our D set.
We now associate vulnerabilities with their likelihood.
Definition 10 (Vulnerability likelihood) Given a depen-
dency graph g = 〈N , E〉, and the set of vulnerabilities
V , the vulnerability likelihood is a mapping v-likelihood :
V × P(N ) → L , where P(N ) is the power set of N .
Running example: Part 10 Security analysts have assigned
a likelihood to the vulnerabilities in V using the follow-
ing scale: Very Likely, Likely and Unlikely. The
likelihood of No UPS and Buffer overflow is Very
Likely.
The v-likelihood(v, Nv) is an estimate of the probability
that the vulnerability v is present in the set of homogeneous
nodes Nv , i.e., nodes which can suffer from the same vul-
nerability with the same likelihood. The simplest and most
frequent case is when we determine the likelihood of a vul-
nerability being present on a single node of g. However, we
might also need to consider the likelihood of a vulnerabil-
ity being present on a set of homogeneous nodes which are
involved in a specific incident. For example, consider the
case in which some malware causes a number of servers to
stop working by exploiting a vulnerability which is present
in an application deployed on all of these servers: in this case
we need to estimate the likelihood of the vulnerability being
present on all of the servers running the application with the
vulnerability, since the resulting incident would affect all of
them at once.
In case of an accurate RA (e.g., when it is possible to do
technical vulnerability verification such as penetration test-
ing), the fact that an application is present on an IT component
can be determined without uncertainty; for example by mak-
ing sure a buffer overflow affects a web server by trying to
exploit it. However, in most cases, due to lack of time, the RA
team has to rely on indirect (and therefore uncertain) infor-
mation, for example, by consulting the NIST National Vul-
nerability Database [43] to check if the web server may suffer
from a specific buffer overflow vulnerability. v-likelihood is
the expression of this uncertainty.
2.4 Output of the QualTD model
We use the information contained in the model to calculate
the risk associated with an incident, which is influenced by
the likelihood that the threat occurs in the ToA (which is
a property of the ToA), the likelihood that a vulnerability
is present in a node or a set of nodes (which expresses the
uncertainty about whether the vulnerability is present in the
nodes) and the estimated disruption severity. In more detail,
an incident causes (by propagation) a disruption with a cer-
tain duration on some nodes of the dependency graph which
have a certain criticality. We call this combination the global
impact of the incident.
Intuitively, the more critical the processes/services
affected and the longer the disruption, the greater the impact
of the incident will be, i.e., the global impact of an incident
is monotone.
Definition 11 (Global impact) Given a dependency graph
g = 〈N , E〉, an incident i = 〈M, v, t〉, a monotone compo-
sition function harm : C × D → H mapping criticality
and duration to business harm, and a monotone aggregation
function impact-agg : H ×· · ·×H → H ; the global impact
of i is defined by global-impact : I → H , such that
global-impact(i) = impact-aggn∈Propi
(harm(criticality(n), dt(i, n))) (1)
Running example: Part 11 The RA team has decided that the
global impact of an incident is calculated using the following
rules:
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a) the global impact isCritical if the incident causes the
disruption of at least one service with High criticality;
b) the global impact is Moderate if the incidents causes a
Long disruption on any service, or a Short disruption
of at least a service with Medium criticality;
c) the impact is Insignificant otherwise.
For example, if we take the above definition (a), the
impact-agg function is given by the “at least one service”
statement, and the harm function is given by associating any
disruption of a service with High criticality to the Criti-
cal impact. According to these rules the criticality of i1, i2,
i3 and i4 is, respectively, Moderate, Insignificant,
Insignificant, Critical.
Now that we have defined the incident global impact we
can evaluate the incident risk, which is a composition of the
likelihood of the threat, the likelihood of the vulnerability
and the global impact of the disruption caused by the threat
materialising.
Intuitively, this means that the more likely it is that a threat
materialises on an IT component (or a set of them), or the
more likely it is that the component is vulnerable to that
threat, and the more harmful the threat is, the more reasons
there will be to protect it against this incident. As for the
global impact, also the incident risk is therefore monotone.
Definition 12 (Incident risk) Given an incident i =〈M, t, v〉,
the incident risk is a monotone composition function i-risk :
L × L × H → R mapping t-likelihood(t), v-likelihood(v)
and global-impact(i) to the risk level of i .
Running example: Part 12 As for the global impact, the RA
team has decided that the risk level of an incident is calculated
using the following rules:
(a) the risk level is High if either the incident has a Crit-
ical global impact and at least Likely threat and
vulnerability likelihood, or if the global impact is Mod-
erate and threat and vulnerability likelihood are both
Very Likely;
(b) the risk level is Medium if either the incident has a
Critical global impact and the threat and vulner-
ability likelihood are both at most Likely, or if the
global impact is Moderate and either threat or vul-
nerability likelihood is Very Likely;
(c) the risk level is Low otherwise.
In this case, i-risk is implemented by means of these three
rules, which associate the combination of global impact,
threat likelihood and vulnerability likelihood to the corre-
spondent risk level. According to these rules, the risk level
of i1, i2, i3, and i4 is respectively: Medium, Low, Low and
High.
An additional operation one would like to do is to aggre-
gate the incident risk in terms of threats and vulnerabili-
ties. Evaluating risk in terms of threats and vulnerabilities is
important to determine both the risk profile of the ToA, i.e.,
which threat sources are the most harmful, and to prioritise
vulnerabilities to be addressed (i.e., patched) first.
Definition 13 (Incident risk aggregated by Threat/Vulnera-
bility) Given a dependency graph g = 〈N , E〉, a threat t and
the set of incidents It = {i | i = 〈Mt , t, vt 〉}, a vulnerability
v and the set of incidents Iv = {i | i = 〈Mv, tv, v〉} and a
monotone aggregation function risk-agg : R×· · ·×R → R ;
the risk of a threat t is an aggregation of the risk level of all
the possible incidents which can originate from that threat
(It ), i.e., the mapping t-risk : R × · · · × R → R such that
t-risk(t) = risk-aggi∈It (i-risk(i)) (2)
Similarly, the risk of a vulnerability v is the aggregation of
the risk level of all the possible incidents in which that vul-
nerability has been exploited (Iv), i.e., the mapping v-risk :
R × · · · × R → R such that
v-risk(v) = risk-aggi∈Iv (i-risk(i)) (3)
Running example: Part 13 If we use Max as the aggrega-
tion function risk-agg to calculate the risk level aggregated
by threat/vulnerability, we assign each threat/vulnerability
the maximum risk level of the incidents they are involved
in. In this way, the risk level of Power outage and DoS
is respectively Medium and High. Accordingly, the risk
level of No UPS and Buffer overflow is, respectively,
Medium and High.
The QualTD model supports the traceability of the RA
results. For instance, suppose the RA has been carried out,
and after some time we want to recall why a DoS is a High
risk for our system, we can go through the records of the
model and discover that
1. it is Likely that a DoS is carried out by exploiting a
Buffer overflow on both DB1 and DB2,
2. both DB1 and DB2 are Very Likely to be prone to a
Buffer overflow
3. the resulting incident causes a Short disruption of the
High critical service CRM-Repository,
4. according to points 1–3 and to the impact and risk level
definitions, the risk of a DoS in the system is High.
When doing impact and risk evaluation we use the compo-
sition and aggregation functions harm, impact-agg, i-risk and
risk-agg, which operate with qualitative values (e.g., High
likelihood andLow impact): the definition of the composition
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and aggregation functions is outside the scope of our model
and it is left to the choice of the RA team. However, these
functions must be monotone and semantically sound with
relation to the meaning that the qualitative values involved
have for the stakeholders of the RA. For example, the defini-
tion of Critical impact we give in the running example
part 11 is semantically sound, whereas it would not have
been sound if we defined as Critical an incident causing
a Short disruption on a service with Low criticality. In the
running example and in Sect. 3.2 we describe two possible
implementations of harm, impact-agg, i-risk and risk-agg,
based on descriptive tables which define all the possible com-
binations of input and output values.
Rationale for a QualTD model It is legitimate to argue
whether the model is sound or not. It is sound iff disruptions
in the model propagate in the same way as in the real sys-
tem. Regarding soundness, the system we propose has three
intrinsic “limitations”: (a) it has only AND and OR nodes,
(b) it does not consider the “recovery time” of the single
components, and (c) it works only if the graph is acyclic.
The first limitation is in our opinion not a problem, as it is
simple to model even very complicated dependencies with
the use of only AND and OR nodes. The second limitation
is a design choice which keeps the model simple, and in our
experience does not affect the fidelity of the model. In any
case, it is straightforward to extend our system to also take
the individual recovery time into consideration, for example
by assigning the recovery time to the nodes and then add-
ing it to the incident downtime during incident propagation.
The third limitation is in our opinion the only true limit of
the system. Our experience says that acyclic graphs are per-
fectly suitable to model practical IT architecture. However, it
is possible to contrive examples in which this is not the case.
For such examples, either one is able to “abstract away” the
cycles (for instance by analysing them separately and mod-
elling them with a single node), or our model is simply not
applicable. Once one accepts the above three intrinsic lim-
itations, then soundness follows from the soundness of the
AND and OR basic nodes: assuming that (1) the nodes of the
dependency graph include all the components of the ToA,
and that (2) for every component the availability dependency
of this component on other components is correctly and com-
pletely included in the graph by means of AND /OR edges,
then the fact that an incident on a certain (set of) components
will propagate in the ToA as predicted by the QualTD model
can be proved by using standard graph theory. We skip the
demonstration for space reasons.
It is the task of the risk assessor using the technique based
on the QualTD model to make sure that hypotheses (1) and
(2) are reasonably verified in a specific case. In Sect. 3 we
will show the technique we used to build the dependency
graph as completely and correctly as possible.
3 Case study
In this section we show how the QualTD model can be used
in a practical RA by describing the case study we carried
out with it. We will also use this case study to evaluate our
technique. Let us start by describing the context in which it
was carried out.
3.1 The industrial context
The organisation We carried out the case study at a large
multinational company with a global presence in over 50
countries (from now on we call it the Company) count-
ing between 100,000 and 200,000 employees. The Com-
pany IT unit supports the business of hundreds of internal
departments by offering thousands of applications accessed
by approximately 100,000 employee workstations and by
many hundreds of business partners. The IT facilities for the
European branch are located at one site: our RA was con-
ducted at that site. IT services are planned, designed, devel-
oped and managed at the Company’s headquarters; those
services, such as e-mail or ERP systems, are part of the IT
infrastructure which is used by all the different Company’s
branches all over Europe.
The stakeholders of the IT service are (1) the Company’s
global IT infrastructure (GIT) management department, (2)
the risk management and compliance (RMC) department, (3)
users: the Company’s units using IT services (including GIT
and RMC) and (4) an outsourcing company managing parts
of the IT infrastructure on behalf of GIT.
GIT provides basic IT infrastructure services such as
desktop management, e-mail and identity management. IT
services are designed internally by GIT and then partly
outsourced for implementation and management to another
company. The outsourced tasks include specialised coding,
server management, help-desk and problem solving services.
RMC supports the compliance to internal policies and best
practices of the Company IT services; part of the tasks of
RMC is to perform on-demand security RAs for the IT ser-
vices of GIT. An RA is usually requested by the owner of
the IT service each time a new service is developed or a new
release of an existing one is about to be deployed.
The other business units of the Company rely on these IT
services for the continuity of their business. Some of these
IT services are developed and managed by the business unit
itself (e.g., if they are specific to the competence area of
the unit), while global company services (e.g., authentica-
tion, e-mail system) are provided by GIT. For efficiency rea-
sons, like in most other large organisations, business units
exchange services by means of a “enterprise internal mar-
ket”: one business unit pays another one for the use of
a given service and the service provider unit finances its
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Fig. 4 An overview of the Oxygen architecture
activities by means of these funds. This mechanism increases
the efficiency of internal service management.
The implementation and the management of some IT ser-
vices are outsourced to another company, which we call the
Service Provider. Although the servers running the IT ser-
vices are owned by the Company and physically kept within
its data centres, the Service Provider manages the OS and
the software running on them. Moreover, for some services,
the Company outsources also the development (e.g., coding,
deployment) of the custom applications to the Service Pro-
vider. The Service Provider has signed contracts with the
Company which include service level agreements (SLAs)
regarding both the security of the information managed by the
outsourcing company and the availability of the outsourced
services.
The target of assessment The system on which we focus our
case study is called Oxygen. Oxygen is the global Identity
Management for employees and sub-contractors of the Com-
pany. The goals of the system are
1. Identity Management: to provide enterprise-wide stan-
dard identities for all employees and contractors of the
Company, integrate identities with the different identity
authoritative sources (e.g., the Human Resources infor-
mation system) and manage them through a governed
process and ensure regulatory and privacy compliance.
2. Identity/Account Linking and data synchronisation: to
provide a holistic view of the many accounts possessed
by a person, enforce account termination when a person
leaves the Company, enable data synchronisation among
identity provider and identity consuming systems for
data accuracy and provide credential mapping, a foun-
dation for Single Sign-On.
3. Identity Service for authentication and authorisation: to
provide operational directory services for general appli-
cations to be used for authentication and authorisation,
to provide unique, standard, organisation-wide identifi-
ers for employees and contractors, and to provide a foun-
dation for advanced authentication and authorisation in
the future.
Oxygen is designed and implemented by the GIT depart-
ment, while the management of the servers running it is out-
sourced to the Service Provider.
Figure 4 depicts the design of Oxygen: the system is
composed of a number of identity stores, which are identity
databases implemented by means of directory services. The
main Identity Store keeps information about all of the identi-
ties and their attributes. The Operational and the Application-
specific stores contain a (partial) replica of this information
and are accessed by the different applications which require
identities for authentication and identification. Replication
of the identity stores is required for performance reasons.
Oxygen collects identity data from different authorita-
tive sources, such as the information system of the Human
Resources department. Data acquisition is performed by
means of drivers, which also take care of synchronising data
between the different identity stores.
In addition to the identity stores, Oxygen exports also a
service portal, which allows employees of the Company to
manage part of their identity record (e.g., updating their home
address, changing password).
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Fig. 5 The internal RA process (above) linked to the steps of the QualTD technique which complement the process (below)
The existing RA method In 2008, the RMC department car-
ried out an RA on the Oxygen system following its internal
RA process, which is mainly based on the guidelines pro-
vided by BS7799-3 [5], while the official security control
policy is compliant with the ISO 27002 [18] standard.
The upper part of Fig. 5 depicts the process usually fol-
lowed by RMC. In the following list we describe the six tasks
composing the RMC process and we link them with the steps
of the QualTD technique.
1. RA intake: the RA team (composed of people from the
RMC department) and the requester project responsible
agree on the scope of the RA and the Target of Assess-
ment (ToA). The requester also submits proper docu-
mentation about the IT service to the RA team. This task
corresponds to the definition of the ToA (see Sect. 2.1)
in the QualTD technique.
2. Business Impact Analysis (BIA): the RA team, together
with the owner of the ToA, determines the desired levels
of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability for the ToA
(e.g., HIGH integrity and availability and LOW confi-
dentiality). They do this by analysing the impact that a
breach of one of the three security properties on the infor-
mation managed by the ToA would have on the business
unit in a realistic worst-case scenario. They also deter-
mine which legislation or regulation requirements the
ToA has to comply with (e.g., SOX [45] compliance).
During this task the definition of the service/process crit-
icality in the QualTD technique (see Sect. 2.1) should be
made.
3. Threat/Vulnerability Assessment (TVA): the RA team
analyses the ToA and determines which threats/vulnera-
bilities the ToA is exposed to. Risk identification is based
on a fixed list of threats/vulnerabilities which has been
derived from a number of existing RA standards (e.g.,
BS7799-3, ISO 17799, BSI IT-Grundshutz [5,16,40])
and customised to fit the needs of the Company. The
BIA influences the TVA in the sense that the threat list is
customised according to the required levels of confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability of the ToA: the higher the
security level, the more detailed the list. The list is then
used to check if the main components of the ToA (e.g.,
network communication, user interface, etc.) are exposed
to the threats/vulnerabilities. At this stage, threats/vul-
nerabilities are flagged as applicable/not applicable to
the considered component of the ToA, and as covered/not
covered according to the fact that controls that could mit-
igate them are already deployed. This task corresponds to
the risk identification step (see Sect. 2.2) in the QualTD
technique.
4. Risk prioritisation: it consists in the evaluation of like-
lihood and impact of the threats/vulnerabilities which
have been marked as applicable and not covered during
the TVA. The risk assessors estimates the likelihood of
a threat/vulnerability based on the company likelihood
model, which takes into account several factors, e.g.,
resources, technical skills and time needed, or attacker
motivation. They estimate the impact of a threat/vulner-
ability, based on the possible incident scenarios that the
threat/vulnerability could determine in the ToA. These
scenarios are figured out by the RA team based on their
personal skills and their knowledge of the ToA. Like-
lihood and impact are then combined to determine the
resulting risk, based on a risk aggregation matrix very
similar to the one of Table 2. Threats and vulnerabilities
are then prioritised based on their risk level: the higher
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the risk, the higher the priority for controls. This task
corresponds to the risk evaluation and to the output of
the QualTD technique steps (see Sects. 2.3, 2.4).
5. Proposal of Controls: the RA team proposes a plan to
cope with the identified risks, and identifies controls to
mitigate the likelihood of the threats or to protect the
ToA from the identified vulnerabilities. Examples of pro-
posed controls include password policies, authentication
mechanisms or Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems.
6. Documentation and reporting: the RA team presents the
results of the RA to the requester. It is not mandatory for
the requester to communicate with the RA team about
follow-up actions taken as a consequence of the RA.
The average time needed for an RA is approximately 240
man-hours (2 people for 3 weeks), depending on the size
of the ToA (usually, RMC carries out RAs on ToAs which
are comparable in size with Oxygen). Roughly, the first
80 man-hours are spent on steps 1 and 2 and for reading
all the relevant documentation, another 80 man-hours are
spent on steps 3 and 4, and the remaining 80 man-hours
are spent on step 5 and to prepare the final report to be
exposed during step 6. The RA team consists of two peo-
ple performing the same task independently and then peer-
reviewing each other’s findings to come to a more objective
final result.
The RA team uses three main sources of information: (a)
documentation provided by the requester, (b) interviews with
the requester and (c) vulnerability scans and other forms of
direct investigation of security weaknesses.
Documentation includes results from previous assess-
ments (i.e., RAs and security auditing activities), all the
design and development documents (i.e., functional speci-
fications, security design, technical architecture design and
software design) and SLAs and outsourcing contracts.
Interviews with the requester are carried out after reading
the documentation to clarify doubts and to set the bound-
aries of the RA. Another interview is carried out to address
the BIA and, after step 4, to discuss about the main risks
identified.
Optionally, the RA includes active forms of investigation
of security weakness. The general principle RMC follows is
trust but verify, which means that documentation about secu-
rity measures implemented is trusted, but verified in its main
aspects by means of, for example, vulnerability scanners.
3.2 Availability RA using the QualTD model
In this section we describe how we employed the QualTD
model together with the RA method of the Company for the
new RA of Oxygen. The main difference of a RA carried out
following the Company internal RA process only with one
carried out following our technique is that we build a depen-
dency graph of the ToA and link threats and vulnerabilities
with each other and with the nodes of the graph to better
estimate impacts. As we discuss in more detail in Sect. 4,
we used likelihood estimates carried out by the Company
RMC personnel, since the QualTD model does not specifi-
cally address this topic.
We combined the QualTD model with four tasks of the
Company internal RA process, as we show in the lower part
of Fig. 5. First, we included in the RA Intake the activity
of building the dependency graph. We spent 80 man-hours
to perform this task. We also re-performed part of the BIA:
instead of only defining the security requirements for Confi-
dentiality, Integrity and Availability, we also assessed the crit-
icality level of the main IT services of the ToA. We spent one
man-hour on this. Finally, we carried out the Threat Vulner-
ability Analysis and Risk prioritisation by using the QualTD
model as we explained in Sect. 2. We spent 72 man-hours to
perform this task.
To build and run the QualTD model for Oxygen we relied
on two sources of information: technical documentation and
interview sessions. In practice we used the same documen-
tation the RA requester provided for R A1, as we describe in
Sect. 3.1. In more detail, four documents were made available
for the RA:
1. The functional specification document: this document
describes the functionalities provided by Oxygen and
how the functional architecture is designed, i.e., soft-
ware components, what is their task and how they relate
to each other.
2. The security architecture and design document: this
document describes which security measures are imple-
mented, e.g., server redundancy, and how they are imple-
mented, e.g., which services are redundant and where
they are located.
3. The internal SLA document: this document describes the
quality of service parameters which are guaranteed to
the users of Oxygen. In the context of availability, this
document describes the availability figures for the differ-
ent services provided by Oxygen, e.g., the authentication
service is guaranteed to be available 99% of the times.
4. The network diagram: this document describes which
are the actual servers running the different components
of the Oxygen system, which software they are running
and in which datacentre they are being managed.
We now describe in detail the activities we performed. For
the sake of exposition we split the description according to
the tasks that compose the Company RA process. Each task
is further split according to the related step of the QualTD
model of Sect. 2, as shown in Fig. 5.
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3.2.1 RA intake
Defining the ToA The first step is building the dependency
graph for Oxygen. According to the level of abstraction
required for this RA, we modelled the following node types:
1. Datacentres: from the security architecture document
and the network diagram we extracted the two buildings
hosting the datacentres in which the servers are split for
redundancy purposes.
2. Network components: from the security architecture doc-
ument and the network diagram we extracted the fire-
walls protecting the different servers and enabling access
to the Oxygen services from the internal network.
3. Servers: from the security architecture and the network
diagram we extracted which servers are used.
4. Applications: from the security architecture, the network
diagram and the functional specification documents we
extracted the applications running on each server.
5. IT Services: from the functional specification and the
internal SLA document we extracted the services
exported by Oxygen, linking them to the applications
implementing them.
The most challenging task in building the dependency
graph was determining the dependencies among the nodes.
The dependencies among buildings, network components,
servers and applications could be inferred from the network
diagram and the security architecture. Unfortunately, the
functional specification document, which should link soft-
ware to IT services, only referred to “logical” software com-
ponents, which are not directly linked to the servers and the
applications running on them. For instance, the functional
component which acquires identity information from the dif-
ferent authoritative identity sources is actually implemented
by three different applications: a Java-based web service,
a Directory service and a DBMS; in turn, the DBMS also
supports other functional components. To determine these
dependencies we proceeded by refinement: whenever in the
documentation we found that a certain application runs on
a certain server, or that the application implements a cer-
tain service, we drew a new dependency among these nodes.
Then, we cross checked the information from the functional
specification and the network diagram documents to make
sure the dependencies we found were consistent through-
out all the documents. When we found an inconsistency, we
updated the model and iterated the process. We reached a
“stable” version of the model after the third iteration of this
process.
To support this step we developed a graphical tool. The
tool allowed us to draw the dependency graph, show it and
modify it quickly during the interview sessions. The result-
ing graph is made of 65 nodes and 112 edges. Among the
nodes we count 13 IT services, 32 applications, 14 serv-
ers equally distributed between 2 datacentres and connected
simultaneously to 2 different network segments by means of
2 different firewalls. Building the first prototype version of
the graph took us approximately 40 man-hours, using only
the four documents we described as a source.
After building this prototype version of the dependency
graph we checked it with the RMC personnel during an inter-
view session: we showed the graph and explained the reasons
motivating each dependency drawn; we then asked for pos-
sible missing ones. For example, we showed that a failure
in the DBMS would lead to the unavailability of the identity
data acquisition service and we asked if this conclusion was
consistent with their knowledge of the system. The answer
was positive; no inconsistencies were found during this ses-
sion. Finally, we performed another interview session with
the developers of the system to further check for consistency
and completeness of the dependency graph. During this ses-
sion we focused our explanation of the graph on the reasons
motivating the choice of modelling a dependency between
two nodes. For example, we motivated the choice of draw-
ing a dependency from the DBMS to the application server
since the Web Service uses the DBMS to store configuration
parameters, and the unavailability of the DBMS would cause
the Web Service to be unable to operate in turn. We found
some discrepancies between our model and the behaviour of
the system which is currently implemented. These discrep-
ancies were due to inaccurate or outdated information in the
functional specification document: we decided to keep the
graph coherent with the actual implementation of Oxygen,
instead of the one present in the documentation. R A1 did not
spot these discrepancies, as the analysis of the ToA required
to build the dependency graph is much more detailed than the
analysis required for an assessment which does not require
to build any formal model.
Figure 6 shows an anonymised version of the dependency
graph we obtained at the end of this task. During the task,
although we did not know anything about Oxygen before our
RA, we were able to build the dependency graph based on
the available documentation. We only relied on interviews to
confirm the correctness of the graph, not to build the graph
itself. This ensures the method can be used by any risk asses-
sor, who must not be an expert of the ToA.
3.2.2 Business impact analysis
After we built the dependency graph, we considered the busi-
ness impact analysis (BIA), which consists of determining
the required level of availability for the whole Oxygen sys-
tem and the criticality level of all the IT services exported
by Oxygen. We did this by interviewing the GIT department
board, together with a member of the RMC department.
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Fig. 6 This dependency graph resembles the one actually built for Oxygen. We observe from the bottom: datacentres, network components, servers,
applications and IT services. Solid edges are AND dependencies, while dashed edges are OR dependencies
Since the required level of availability for Oxygen had
already been assessed during R A1, we only made sure that
that part of the BIA was still valid. The GIT personnel con-
firmed that Oxygen requires a High level of availability. We
then used this parameter during the risk identification phase
for the selection of the threats and vulnerabilities to be used,
as we describe in Sect. 3.2.3.
The new step of the BIA required by the QualTD model,
which is not part of the RA method of the Company, consists
of assessing the criticality of the IT services. For each IT
service in the dependency graph we asked the GIT personnel
if it had a High, Medium or Low criticality. In this way we
defined the criticality function (see Definition 2).
After this last interview we had a final (approved) version
of the dependency graph representing the ToA.
3.2.3 Threat/vulnerability analysis
Risk identification Recall that the RMC department adopted
a threat/vulnerability list for their RAs, which was extracted
from a number of standard RA methods and customised to fit
the needs of the Company. To be able to compare the results
of R A2 with R A1 we used the same threats and vulnerabil-
ities. We will describe in more detail the reasons why we
chose to do this in Sect. 4.
The list comprises a total of 121 threats and vulnerabilities.
Since we only assess availability risks, we selected the subset
of this list with an impact on availability, relying on the clas-
sification done by the RMC which determines for each entry
if it has an impact on confidentiality, integrity or availabil-
ity. Consequently, the set T was composed of 22 threats and
the set V of 39 vulnerabilities. Moreover, according to the
Company RA method, threats and vulnerabilities are selected
based on the required level of Confidentiality, Integrity or
Availability for the ToA. Since the level of availability of
Oxygen has not changed in the two RAs we are allowed to
use the same availability threats and vulnerabilities.
The next step we carried out was to link threats with
vulnerabilities. During R A1 threats and vulnerabilities were
assessed separately, while the QualTD model requires us to
link threats with vulnerabilities (thereby making explicit the
reasoning that was implicitly done during R A1). We did
this by selecting, for each of the 22 threats, which one of
the 39 vulnerabilities the threat can exploit to materialise.
To validate our threat-vulnerability mapping we explained
our choices to the RMC personnel during an interview ses-
sion, and we integrated our mapping based on their opin-
ion. Although no major inconsistency was found, we had to
change a small number of mappings, because of a misinter-
pretation of the description of some threats.
Subsequently, we determined which nodes of the depen-
dency graph were targeted by threats and in which nodes a
certain vulnerability was present. To do this we evaluated
which kind of node the threat/vulnerability applies to; for
example, a power disruption can only affect a datacentre and
a DoS attack can only affect software nodes.
Finally, we enumerated the availability incidents follow-
ing Definition 5. This task was performed automatically by
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intersecting threats with the nodes they target, vulnerabili-
ties with the nodes they are present in and threats with the
vulnerabilities they can exploit. We inserted all this informa-
tion in a database. Therefore, listing incidents was nothing
more than building a view on the existing table schema. We
checked our results with the RMC personnel, to detect incon-
sistencies in our mapping, but we found no discrepancy, as
mapping threats and vulnerabilities to asset types was quite
an unambiguous task.
3.2.4 Risk prioritisation
Risk evaluation We used the estimates of the likelihood of
threats and vulnerabilities from R A1, (for the definition of
the t-likelihood and v-likelihood functions see Definitions 8
and 10). The estimate was done in terms of High, Medium
and Low likelihood level, according to the likelihood model
adopted by the RMC team, which is based on eight different
parameters (e.g., time needed for the attacker, technical skills
needed, etc.). The reason why we did not do our own estimate
of the likelihood is twofold: first, we needed to ensure that the
results of the two RAs could be comparable, and since our
model only implies a different way in estimating the impact,
likelihood had to be kept fixed. Second, since the results of
this second RA are meant to be used by GIT, we wanted the
likelihood estimates to be based on the professional judge-
ment of the RMC personnel, instead of ours.
To assess incident duration (i.e., the dt function of Defi-
nition 9) we first used the Company-internal SLAs to set the
threshold between aShort andLong incident duration. The
Company-internal SLAs give an availability figure for the IT
services provided by Oxygen. For example, they guarantee
that the identity data acquisition service will be available for
a certain fraction of time in a month. We set the threshold
as the longest amount of time (in hours) the service can be
out of service while remaining compliant with its SLA. For
example, if the availability figure is 99.5% in a month (i.e., 30
days), we set 4 h as our threshold. We choose this measure,
since, in this case, the SLAs were set to give an indication
about how long a certain service can be disrupted without
causing excessive problems to the Company’s business. In
this way, we distinguished between Short incidents (i.e.,
those shorter than the maximum tolerated disruption time
in a month) and Long ones (i.e., those which last longer
than the maximum tolerated disruption time in a month).
Subsequently, we analysed the time needed to solve each of
the incidents. We considered both the time needed to detect
the disruption and the time needed to fix the problem. The
resulting total disruption time, which we compared with the
threshold, is the sum of these two parameters. We performed
this analysis based on both the information we gained from
the SLA document the Company has signed with the out-
sourcer, and the opinion of the developers of the Oxygen
Table 1 Global impact level determination
Impact level Definition
Critical At least one service/process with High criticality
is disrupted for a Long period of time
Serious At least one service/process with High criticality
is disrupted for a Short period of time
Significant At least one service/process with Medium
criticality is disrupted for a Long period of time
Moderate At least one service/process with Medium
criticality is disrupted for a Short period of
time
Marginal At least one service/process with Low criticality
is disrupted for a Long period of time
Insignificant No service/process is disrupted or only
service/process with Low criticality are
disrupted for a Short period of time
system. The SLA document contains the maximum response
time for incidents happening in the portions of the system for
which management has been outsourced. For all the remain-
ing parts of the system we relied on the judgement of the GIT
developers.
With this we had acquired all the information needed to
run the model and obtained the global impact of the incidents
and their risk. For each incident i we used the dependency
graph to determine the set Propi of the processes and services
which were affected by the incident given the IT components
the incident directly targets as we described in Definition 7.
Subsequently, we used Table 1 to determine the global impact
level. The definitions we used are based on the requirements
for availability the GIT has set on Oxygen during the meet-
ing in which we assessed the criticality of services/processes.
These definitions are an implementation of the combination
of the composition function harm and the aggregation func-
tion impact-agg of Definition 11.
We then used the definitions of Table 2 to determine the
risk level associated with every incident. The definition of the
risk level we give was built on the indications of the RMC
personnel, and it is an implementation of the function i-risk
of Definition 12.
The choice of using these two tables to evaluate the global
impact and the risk level was driven by two main motiva-
tions: first, the functions defined by the tables are monotone;
therefore, they are compliant with the requirements of Defini-
tions 11 and 12, and they allow one to trace back the reasons
causing the assignment of a certain risk level to a certain
incident (see Running example 13). Second, the alternative
choice of assigning a numerical value to each qualitative one
(e.g., High = 3, Med = 2 and Low = 1) and then performing
mathematical operations on them (e.g., sum, multiplication
or average) would not work in our case. In fact, although
this is a very popular and widely adopted technique in RAs
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Table 2 Incident risk level determination
Risk level Definition
High Impact is Critical, both threat and
vulnerability likelihood are Medium. Impact is
Serious, both threat and vulnerability
likelihood are High
Med-High Impact is Critical, either threat or
vulnerability likelihood is Low. Impact is
Serious, both threat and vulnerability
likelihood are Medium. Impact is
Significant, both threat and vulnerability
likelihood are High
Med Impact is Serious, either threat or vulnerability
likelihood is Low. Impact is Significant,
both threat and vulnerability likelihoods are
Medium. Impact is Moderate, either threat or
vulnerability likelihood is High
Med-Low Impact is Significant, either threat or
vulnerability likelihood is Low. Impact is
Moderate, both threat and vulnerability
likelihood are Medium. Impact is Marginal,
both threat and vulnerability likelihoods are
High
Low In other cases
(e.g., see Cunningham et al. [7]), it only provides meaningful
results if we know the exact ratio among the qualitative values
(e.g., if we knew that High is exactly three times Medium
we could assign 9 to High and 3 to Medium). Since our RA
was carried out in a completely qualitative manner, we only
know that High is bigger than Medium, but we do not have
any indication on how big the ratio is between them; there-
fore, we cannot perform any mathematical operation on these
values. In other words, we work with values in an Ordinal
scale, while the other approach would at least require values
in an Interval scale, as shown by Herrmann [12].
Having determined the risk level, we ranked availability
incidents according to their risk. However, to complete the
outcome of the threat/vulnerability assessment step, we also
needed to rank the most dangerous threats and vulnerabilities
for Oxygen. We did this by assigning each threat/vulnerabil-
ity the risk of the incident they cause, which has the highest
level associated. In other words, we used max as the aggre-
gation function risk-agg of Definition 13.
4 Case study evaluation
In this section we make an evaluation of our case study. To
this end, the methodology we follow is the one introduced by
Wieringa et al. [29,30] for technical research, which is based
on the following two statements:
1. solution & context produces effects
2. effects satisfy (to an acceptable extent) stake-
holder-motivated criteria
Wieringa et al. observe that each technological solution
which is applied in a context produces some effects on it.
The effects may (or may not) contribute to satisfy some
goals defined by the stakeholders of the research context.
The evaluation criteria set by the stakeholders must be in a
measurable or comparable form, so that if two different solu-
tions are applied to the same context, they can be evaluated
and compared with relation to these criteria. The reasoning
scheme can be applied when a solution is specified but not
yet implemented [11] or after a solution is implemented [24].
In our case, the technical solutions to be evaluated are the
RAs performed on the Oxygen system: the first is done fol-
lowing the RA method of the Company and the second made
by integrating the same method with the QualTD model.
The context in which we apply these solutions is described
in Sect. 3.1.
4.1 Stakeholders, goals, and criteria
First, we present the stakeholder’s goals and the derived eval-
uation criteria, which we have already briefly introduced in
Sect. 3.1. These goals regard both specifically (the security
of) Oxygen and the quality of the general RA process. Meth-
odologically, we derive the goals by analysing the descrip-
tion of the activities GIT provided us during the interviews;
subsequently we defined the criteria to measure those goals.
Finally, we validated the goals and criteria by means of inter-
views with the stakeholders. For the sake of the presentation
we only report the results of this activity in the list below.
Although our case study will not allow us to evaluate all
the criteria, we report them all to give an overview of stake-
holder’s objectives.
Goals and criteria regarding Oxygen:
– GIT
1.1 The goal Ensure cost/effective mitigation controls
and timely mitigation plans is measured by the qual-
ity criterion Cost for managing High/Medium/Low
risks.
1.2 The goal Implement controls with the least possible
contractual and financial impact is measured by the
quality criterion number of controls with contrac-
tual and financial impact.
– Services depending on Oxygen
1.3 The goal Have the authentication/identity service
for their application available when needed is mea-
sured by the quality criteria number of times authen-
tication was not available in one month and number
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of times identity management was not available in
one month.
– The Service Provider
1.4 The goal Manage systems with the least possi-
ble effort and by remaining compliant with SLAs
is measured by the quality criteria Euro/resources
employed for managing hardware/software and to
guarantee SLAs (including consequences for not
fulfilling contractual obligations).
Goals and criteria regarding the RA process:
– RMC
2.1 The goal Ensure good quality of the RA Service is
measured by the quality criterion number of impor-
tant risks for the RA requester identified during an
RA vs. number of unimportant risks.
2.2 The goal Make the RA process more efficient is mea-
sured by the quality criterion number of man-hours
employed for an RA by the members of the team.
2.3 The goal Make the RA process less subjective is mea-
sured by the quality criterion number of choices let
to the risk assessor.
– GIT
2.4 The goal Use global (shared) solutions to solve the
same problem in different systems is measured by
the quality criteria number of months to implement
controls and number of different solutions employed
to solve the same problem in different systems.
4.2 Design of the evaluation process
Given the stakeholders goals and criteria, we use them to
analyse and compare the results of R A2 with those of R A1.
First, we briefly discuss the procedure we followed. In this
analysis we assume that, given a method to calculate the risk
in an RA, the quality of an RA is only determined by the
knowledge of the risk assessor about (a) the ToA, (b) threats
and their likelihood, (c) vulnerabilities and their likelihood
and (d) how threats, vulnerabilities relate to each other and
impact the ToA. We choose not to include all the social/organ-
isational factors, e.g., the relationships among the stakehold-
ers and their commitment to IT security, the alignment of
all the stakeholders with respect to the organisation busi-
ness goals, etc. These factors are indeed very important for
the success of an RA but, for the sake of this evaluation,
we assume them to have remained steady in the Company
throughout the two RAs, and therefore to have no impact. For
more examples of other IT RA social/organisational success
factors, please refer to [9,35]. The experiment we carried out
compares the results of two RAs, performed sequentially by
different people on the same IT system. For these reasons, to
keep the experiment under control, we needed to make sure
that (1) the order in which the RAs were carried out does not
influence their results, and (2) the quality of the results does
not depend on the security skills of the people carrying out
the RAs. To accomplish these conditions we conducted R A2
before having access to the results of R A1, but using the same
sources of information. We used the same list of threats and
vulnerabilities, as well as the same likelihood estimation, in
both the RAs and we made sure the technique we employed
to relate threats, vulnerabilities and nodes did not depend on
the particular security skills of the risk assessor.
Table 3 summarises the conditions that we enforced to
ensure the two RAs are comparable.
In the next sections we compare the results of R A2 with
relation to R A1. To do that we use four evaluation criteria
from the list of Sect. 4.1. These parameters are (2.1) the num-
ber of important risks for the RA requester vs. the number of
unimportant ones (recall that in R A1 a risk is the combina-
tion of the likelihood and impact of a threat/vulnerability),
(2.2) the number of man-hours employed to carry out the RA,
(2.3) the number of choices that the RMC personnel have to
take and (2.1) the cost of managing availability risks. The
other criteria of the list are not decidable by a risk assessor
but would be observable after the system has been in use for a
while. An RA will have an impact on how the system scores
on these criteria but based on our evaluation alone we cannot
tell what the impact of our technique will be.
For the sake of presentation, we summarise the results: (1)
the QualTD model has improved the (perceived) accuracy of
R A2 by increasing the number of identified important risks
for the RA requester, (2) it introduced an overhead in the
number of hours employed, (3) it helped reducing the sub-
jectivity of impact estimates in R A2 and (4) thanks to the
effects of points (1) and (3), the QualTD model supports a
better risk prioritisation, which is one of the requirements for
optimising the cost of risk mitigation.
To further substantiate our findings, our technique should
be tested by people who did not participate in its develop-
ment. We plan to have this test done by the RMC personnel
of the Company.
4.3 Evaluation of the criteria
Evaluation of Criterion 2.1: number of important risks for
the RA requester vs. number of unimportant risks The first
evaluation criterion is given by the number of important risks
for the RA requester with respect to the less important ones
and it expresses the result quality of an RA method.
With important risks, here we mean the threats/vulnerabili-
ties which have a high or medium risk level (i.e., the ones that
will be taken into account when deciding the risk profile of
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Table 3 RA comparison control
variables (1) RA Order (2) Security skills
(a) ToA Used the same documentation in
the two RAs. R A2 is blind to
the results of R A1 (see
Sect. 3.2.1)
Build the dependency graph does
not require to be an expert of
the ToA (see Sect. 3.2.1)
(b) Threats & likelihood The same threat list and
likelihood estimation was used
for R A1 and R A2 without any
change (see Sect. 3.2.3)
Only the security skills of the
RMC team have been
employed in the two RAs for
threat identification and
likelihood estimation (see
Sect. 3.2.3)
(c) Vulnerabilities &
likelihood
The same vulnerability list and
likelihood estimation was used
for R A1 and R A2 without any
change (see Sect. 3.2.3)
Only the security skills of the
RMC team have been
employed in the two RAs for
vulnerability identification and
likelihood estimation (see
Sect. 3.2.3)
(d) Combining threats,
vulnerabilities and
nodes
R A2 does not use any
information of R A1 about this
(see Sect. 3.2.3)
We combined threats with
vulnerabilities in accordance
with the personnel who carried
out R A1. Linking
threats/vulnerabilities with
nodes does not depend on
particular security skills (see
Sect. 3.2.3)
the system and the risk mitigation strategy) which are judged
to have been assessed accurately. In this case the number
of relevant risks identified in the two RAs is not influenced
by the number of threats/vulnerabilities identified or by their
likelihood, as the list of threats/vulnerabilities remained the
same in both assessments as well as their likelihood estima-
tion. On the other hand, the risk of a threat/vulnerability can
be overestimated or underestimated in case certain incidents
and their impact are not taken into account in the RA. In this
case, we would have important risks which are not considered
when the risk level of the corresponding threat/vulnerabil-
ity has been underestimated, or less important risks consid-
ered as important, when the risk level of the corresponding
threat/vulnerability has been overestimated. We focus our
evaluation on this aspect.
To determine the performance in identifying important
risks of R A2 with respect to R A1, we compared and analysed
the results of the two RAs together with the RMC personnel.
First, we made sure that risks were evaluated following
the same criteria in both RAs, i.e., given the same threat and
vulnerability likelihood and impact levels, the resulting risk
level is the same.
Second, we analysed the cases in which the two RAs gave
different results and we analysed the reasons for the differ-
ence. Table 4 summarises our findings. The RMC personnel
acknowledges that in all cases, the risk estimation made in
R A2 is more accurate than the one previously made in R A1.
For this reason, in Table 4 we set the estimation given by R A2
as a reference for R A1 and we say R A1 overestimates the
risk level of a threat/vulnerability when the risk level given by
R A1 is higher than the one given by R A2 for that threat/vul-
nerability. The same applies when the risk level given by
R A1 is lower than the one given by R A2, in this case we say
R A2 underestimates the risk level of a threat/vulnerability.
In seven cases, the reason of the difference was due to
external causes that do not involve the use of the QualTD
model. For example, in R A1 the vulnerabilities regarding the
configuration of the Company network were usually under-
estimated on purpose. This because the final report of the
RA carried out without the model was directed to the GIT
board, who is not directly managing the Company network.
Consequently, the judgement of the RMC team was that it
was not useful to point out the obvious in the report, since
the RA requester had no way of managing that kind of risk.
The remaining 14 differences are due to a better quality
of R A2.
According to our analysis, the success of R A2 is due to
the fact that the QualTD model enables the risk assessor to
estimate with more precision the impact of a threat material-
ising, and also to determine the impact of the vulnerabilities,
by explicitly linking them to the incidents they can cause: all
these operations are hard to perform without an architecture
model that allows one to reason about the availability impact.
For example, the impact of malware (e.g., worms) spreading
across the Company network and infecting the (few) Win-
dows servers of Oxygen were underestimated due to the lack
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Table 4 Summary of the
number of differences between
the two RAs
Threats Vulnerabilities Total
Related to Availability 22 39 61
R A1 overestimates risk level 1 2 3
R A1 underestimates risk level 5 13 18
Differences caused by factors not related to the QualTD model 1 6 7
Differences caused by using the QualTD model 5 9 14
of awareness of the risk assessors during R A1 about the con-
nections between these servers and other core components
of Oxygen.
Evaluation of Criterion 2.2: number of man-hours employed
for an RA We split the analysis on time consumption of the
two RAs according to the four steps of the Company RA
process supported by the QualTD model.
1. RA intake: the time needed to accomplish this step with
the Company method is 80 man-hours (by two people) on
average. Building the dependency graph certainly con-
stitutes an overhead, since it requires to formalise the
knowledge acquired from the documentation and it also
required at least one additional meeting with the devel-
opers of the system. In our case, we spent approximately
80 man hours (by one person) to finish the RA intake
step using the QualTD model. About 40 man-hours were
needed to gain knowledge of the Company, which would
not have been necessary by an experienced RA team in
the Company itself. So we think that one person of the
RA team of the RMC department, experienced as we
are, would have needed about 50 man-hours to build the
dependency graph. Currently, the RA intake takes 80
man-hours (by two people), so the overhead introduced
by our model would be of approximately 10 man-hours.
Whether this is worth the investment depends on the ben-
efits to be gained from this in terms of a more accurate
RA and in terms of the reusability of this graph for future
RAs of this or other (related) systems.
2. BIA: including the estimation of the service/process criti-
cality into the business impact analysis is an inexpensive
task, since it is already included in the procedure fol-
lowed by the RMC personnel, only in an informal way.
Moreover, we experienced that it was easy for the GIT to
rank the services by criticality, since this knowledge is
part of their everyday business. Formalising service/pro-
cess criticality took less than one man-hour.
3. TVA: differently to the Company method, the QualTD
model explicitly requires to link threats and vulnerabil-
ities to the nodes of the dependency graph to evaluate
the risk. This task took us approximately 30 man-hours
more than the time normally employed by the RMC per-
sonnel. However, this is partly due to the fact that we had
to “learn” and get used to the definitions of the threats
and vulnerabilities of the list provided by the Company.
We estimate that, should we have known them better we
would have done the same job in half the time. More-
over, another good part of the work was that of manually
linking threats and vulnerabilities to nodes; we did this
step by hand and it was very time consuming: a proper
GUI would have saved us other time.
4. Risk prioritisation: using the QualTD model does facil-
itate this step. In fact, following the Company RA pro-
cess, the RA team has to perform a (time-expensive)
peer review of the risk evaluation performed by each
member of the team, i.e., the team members have to
go through their personal estimation of likelihood and
impact for each threat/vulnerability and, in case they
find any discrepancy, determine the reasons motivating
each decision and reach a final agreement on the proper
likelihood/impact levels. The QualTD model allows one
to automatically prioritise threats and vulnerabilities.
Moreover, as risks are evaluated in a more detailed
level (i.e., incidents instead of threats/vulnerabilities),
the QualTD model facilitates the discussion on the final
impact level of threats/vulnerabilities. For example, dur-
ing the discussion with the RMC personnel on the final
results of R A2, we used the model to explain why a
certain threat or vulnerability had a certain risk level
by going into detail on the incidents that these threats
and vulnerability are involved in. This technique was
judged very useful and practical by the RMC personnel.
It is also possible to reuse most of the work of linking
threats, nodes and vulnerabilities for future RAs on the
same ToA, this would reduce to zero the difference with
the original method in the time consumption on the TVA
step.
Evaluation of Criterion 2.3: number of choices let to the risk
assessor Making the RA results more inter-subjective (i.e.,
shared among the RA stakeholders) is one of the original
goals of the RMC department, which aims at (a) delivering
better quality results by identifying as many potential and
relevant risks as possible, and (b) being able to justify the
reasons why a certain threat or vulnerability was given a cer-
tain risk level.
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The QualTD model supports the first objective by “forc-
ing” the risk assessor to systematically explore all the possi-
ble combinations of threats and vulnerabilities, thus reducing
the risk of mis-estimating the importance of a certain threat
or vulnerability.
Regarding the second objective, since the QualTD model
requires to enumerate explicitly availability incidents, it
is easier for the risk assessor to trace the reasons why a
threat/vulnerability was given a certain risk level (recall that
we can calculate an aggregated risk level for both threats and
vulnerabilities from the incident risks). Moreover, a member
of the RMC department has to give (explicitly or implicitly)
four subjective estimates to evaluate a single incident: the
likelihood of the threat, the likelihood that the vulnerability
is present in some nodes, the duration of the incident and the
criticality of the services/processes it hits. By applying the
QualTD model, the global impact of an incident is based on
the criticality of the nodes involved, which is given by the RA
requester. In this way, we reduce by one fourth the number of
choices to be taken by the RMC personnel (alone) for each
incident, and increases the inter-subjectivity of the results, as
the criticality of the services has to be agreed upon before the
RA starts. In other words, even if the subjectivity of the esti-
mates is still present, it depends less on the expertise of the
single risk assessor, and it is shared with the risk assessment
requester, who is the final user of the assessment results.
Evaluation of Criterion 1.1: Cost of risk management The
budget for managing risks is always limited. In this perspec-
tive, optimising the costs of RM means achieving at least the
same security level for at most the same price. To achieve
this goal, it is important to adequately prioritise the risks one
wants to manage in terms of (a) the risk level, and (b) the cost
to mitigate that risk. By providing a more precise risk priori-
tisation based on (a), the QualTD model supports part of the
decision process of prioritising risks for mitigation purposes.
At present time, however, the model does not include any
means of prioritising risks with respect to (b). Actually, our
model bears similarities with the quantitative TD model [31]
which, on the other hand, does include countermeasures and
enables one to run an optimisation algorithm which select
the best risk mitigation strategy taking into account (a) and
(b). We believe that the same approach is applicable also to
the QualTD model with few modifications. This is, however,
beyond the scope of this paper, and left as future work.
4.4 Applicability to other scenarios
Based on the experience of the case-study, we observe that
there are two main factors which determined the success of
the QualTD model.
First, the model forces the RA team to follow a more
systematic approach; this means that there is less space
for human errors and that the model provides an afford-
able way to deal with the complexity of the ToA. The
QualTD model shares this characteristic with many other
model-based approaches, as for example model checking
techniques. This also means that, as other model-based
approaches, it requires a preliminary investment in terms of
time and resource to build the model. With this case-study
we showed that the time investment does not exceed 50% of
the time spent in an RA carried out without the model, and
the resources commonly available for an RA are sufficient
to build the model. In general, this investment can be very
worthwhile (because, e.g., it allows one to reuse the informa-
tion gathered or it allows one to identify problems that would
remain undetected with other techniques), or just a waste of
resources. In our case, as confirmed by the RMC team, a
QualTD model built for an RA can be widely reused in the
following RAs of the same ToA; the resource investment can
thus be compensated by reusing the model in successive RAs.
This makes it particularly suitable when the ToA is periodi-
cally subject to RAs. Moreover, we believe our model-based
RA approach should only be used when it either allows one to
save resources in the long run (as explained above) or when
the need for accurate results is worth the effort of using it.
In the case analysed here, Oxygen is an availability-critical
system for the Company, and therefore the need for accuracy
in the assessment justified the time overhead it introduced.
Also, the need to optimise the budget for risk mitigation could
be a leading factor for choosing the QualTD model and afford
its initial time overhead. Another scenario in which using the
QualTD model could be convenient is when the dependency
graph can be built automatically (e.g., when a configuration
management database is already present and can be used to
build the graph), since in this case there is almost no time
overhead.
A second success factor of the QualTD model is that it
links the knowledge about security with the components of
an IT architecture, their technical and functional dependen-
cies and their importance. With this case-study we showed
that the QualTD model structures information in a way that
is simple enough to be used and complete enough to cover all
the aspects that are important for a security RA. In fact, we
did not find any uncovered risk area in R A1 which was not
covered in R A2. For this reason, we think that the QualTD
model is particularly suitable to be used to assess the avail-
ability risks of an IT infrastructure or of parts of it.
5 Related work
This section is divided into two parts. In the first part we
make a taxonomy of standard RA methods, and we single
out the methods, or the characteristics of these methods, that
are compatible with the technique we presented in this paper.
123
E. Zambon et al.
In the second part, we do a literature review of the techniques
that use dependency-based models to improve the quality of
an RA; we compare them with the technique we presented
in this paper and we discuss their applicability to the paper’s
industrial case.
5.1 Combining the QualTD model to standard RA methods
In this part we look at general RA methods, and we discuss
under which circumstances the QualTD model can be used in
combination with them. To do this, we first make a taxonomy
of RA methods.
5.1.1 A taxonomy of RA methods
To provide a snapshot of the state-of-the-art within RA meth-
ods we follow the survey by the European Network and Infor-
mation Security Agency (ENISA) [39]. The survey consists
of a list of sixteen RA methods currently in use. Among these
methods we only consider international standards, i.e., those
which are available in English and which are actually in use in
more than one country. According to these criteria, we reduce
the initial list of sixteen methods to ten: CRAMM [36],
EBIOS [38], ISAMM [37], ISO 13335-2 [14], ISO 17799
(now ISO 27002) [18], ISO 27001 [17], IT-Grundshutz [40],
MEHARI [42], OCTAVE [32], NIST SP 800-30 [27]. The
remaining six methods are dropped because of two rea-
sons: Austrian IT Security Handbook, Dutch A&K Analysis
and MARION because only available in a single language
(German or Dutch), while ISF, MAGERIT and MIGRA
because of lack of relevant documentation. Finally, since the
list on the ENISA survey is not admittedly complete, we aug-
ment it with another popular method, the Australian/New
Zeland standard for RM AS/NZS4360 [33], and with CO-
RAS [8], the method resulting from the EU-funded project
IST-2000-25031. We explicitly choose to exclude Common
Criteria [15] from this list as it is not properly an RA method,
even if it requires some risk analysis to be performed.
For the sake of the presentation, we classify the 12 meth-
ods by means of three parameters: (1) the scale used to evalu-
ate risk and risk factors (quantitative or qualitative), (2) which
factors are proposed in the method to evaluate the impact
level and (3) the underlying view on how risk is evaluated.
Parameter (1) determines if the risk level measures some-
thing that can be (meaningfully) expressed in numbers (e.g.,
money), or something which can only be expressed with
labels (e.g., high, medium, low). In other words, a quali-
tative method measures the level of a risk factor in an ordinal
scale (i.e., only ordering among values are known), while a
quantitative method uses measures in interval or ratio scales
(i.e., the magnitude of the difference between two values in
the scale is known; ratio scales also define an absolute and
non arbitrary zero point).
Parameter (2) indicates which factors influence the impact
of a security event (i.e., a threat, a vulnerability or an inci-
dent), and to which extent the method is constrained by these
factors. Some methods only give general guidelines (e.g., the
damage to the organisation), while others strictly define a par-
ticular set of parameters (e.g., the money loss, or the affected
business processes).
Parameter (3) investigates what determines the risk level
of a security event and how different properties are combined.
To this end we elaborated five different profiles (Type 1 to
Type 5):
1. Type 1:
Risk(T hreat, Asset) = Likelihood(T hreat) ⊗ V ul-
nerabili t y(T hreat, Asset)⊗I mpact (T hreat, Asset)
In Type 1 methods, risk is analysed with relation to a
threat and an asset, or a group of assets and it is evalu-
ated as the combination of the likelihood of the threat,
the vulnerability level of the asset(s) to the threat and
the impact of the threat on the asset(s). We argue that
this approach can be applied both to fine-grained assess-
ments (i.e., taking into account single assets and asset-
specific threats) and to more high-level assessments (i.e.,
taking into account only classes of assets and high-level
threats).
2. Type 2:
Risk(T hreat, Asset, Needs) = I mpact (T hreat,
Needs) ⊗ V ulnerabili t y(T hreat, Asset)
In Type 2 methods, risk is analysed with relation to a
threat, an asset and some security needs on the system
and it is evaluated as the combination of the vulnerabil-
ity of the asset and the impact of the threat on the secu-
rity needs. We argue that this approach is suitable where
security requirements are clearly specified, for example
for software products developed by following a rigorous
software engineering process.
3. Type 3:
Risk(T hreat, Asset) = Annual Loss Expectancy
(T hreat, Asset) = Probabili t y(T hreat, Asset) ⊗
AverageLoss(T hreat, Asset)
In Type 3 methods, risk is analysed w.r.t a threat and
an asset, is intended as the annual loss expectancy (in
monetary terms), and it is evaluated as the combination
of the probability of the threat affecting the asset and the
average loss of the resulting incident. We argue that this
approach is suitable in all the situations in which deci-
sions are taken based on a financial cost/benefit analysis
(e.g., insurance companies), and in which quantitative
data are available (e.g., for critical infrastructures).
4. Type 4:
Risk(T hreat, Critical Asset) = I mpact (T hreat,
Critical Asset) ⊗ V ulnerabili t y(Critical Asset)
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Table 5 Classification of the
RA methods Method Evaluation scale Impact evaluation Risk evaluation
CRAMM Qualitative Based on open damage scenarios Type 1
EBIOS Qualitative Based on security needs Type 2
ISAMM Quantitative Based on monetary loss Type 3
ISO 13335-2 Both Based on the business harm N/A
ISO 17799 Qualitative Based on the business harm N/A
ISO 27001 Qualitative N/A N/A
IT-Grundschutz Qualitative Based on open damage scenarios Type 5
MEHARI Qualitative Based on fixed damage scenarios Type 1
OCTAVE Qualitative Based on critical assets Type 4
NIST SP 800-30 Qualitative Based on open damage scenarios Type 1
AS/NZS 4360 Both Based on a balance between business
harm and business advantages
Type 5
CORAS Both Based on open damage scenarios Type 5
In Type 4 methods, risk is analysed with relation to
a threat and an asset that has previously been identified
as critical, and it is assessed as the combination of the
impact of the threat on the critical asset and the vulnera-
bility of the asset. We argue that this approach is suitable
where there are critical assets to be protected (e.g., for
utility network infrastructures).
5. Type 5:
Risk(I ncident, Asset) = Likelihood(I ncident) ⊗
Consequences(I ncident, Asset)
In Type 5 methods, risk is analysed with relation to
and incident (i.e., a combination of a threat and some
vulnerabilities) and an asset, and it is evaluated as the
combination of the likelihood of the incident and the
consequences of the incident itself. Unlike for the Type
1 approach, this approach attributes risk levels only to
security incidents (i.e., a threat exploiting a vulnerabil-
ity) to assess their risk. We argue that this means that it
is more suitable to be applied to fine-grained RAs and it
is harder to apply to the high-level ones.
Table 5 reports the results of the classification. Most of the
methods are meant to be used with qualitative measurements,
and this confirms the fact that most RAs today are carried out
in a qualitative way, mainly due to lack of reliable quantita-
tive data or to time constraints [3].
Regarding impact level evaluation, we observe that ISO
13335-2 and ISO 17799 only specify that the impact of a
security event is tied to the business harm suffered from the
organisation. Furthermore, AS/NZS 4360 also specify the
possibility of a business advantage of undertaking a certain
risk, e.g., leaving servers unpatched may lead to a quicker
time to market for the organisation. CRAMM, IT-Grund-
shutz, NIST SP 800-30 and CORAS specify more precisely
how the impact level should be assessed, since they introduce
the concept of damage scenarios: the RA team should iden-
tify different impact scenarios (e.g., from Catastrophic
to Marginal) which describe the negative consequences of
a risk event on the organisation. We say that these scenarios
are “open” as these methods do not specify a particular set of
scenarios or they do not require to use the ones they propose.
On the other hand, MEHARI is based on a “fixed” impact sce-
nario, i.e., the description of the consequences is fixed, and
the risk assessor can only rank them. EBIOS imposes that
the impact level of a security event is assessed in terms of the
security needs (i.e., a security requirement on the IT assets)
that the event violates. Similarly, in OCTAVE the impact level
is measured in terms of how “hard” the security event is hit-
ting a mission-critical asset (e.g., a server which has been
pre-determined to be critical for the organisation). Finally,
ISAMM measures impact by means of the money the orga-
nisation can loose because of a security event.
Regarding risk level evaluation, we observe that CRAMM
(which mostly implements the principles given in BS7799-
3 [5]), MEHARI and NIST SP 800-30 share the same com-
mon view on risk, i.e., they all consider risk as a combination
of the likelihood and the impact of a threat to hit a group
of assets and the vulnerability level of this group of assets.
Similarly, IT-Grundshutz, AS/NZS 4360 and CORAS con-
sider risk as the combination of the likelihood of an incident
(i.e., a threat exploiting some vulnerabilities) and the conse-
quences (positive or negative) of this incident happening. On
the other hand, Type 2, Type 3 and Type 4 profiles are
intrinsically tied to a particular approach to RA, since Type
2 and Type 4 rely on qualitative concepts for defining risk
(e.g., critical assets, security needs) and Type 3 relies on
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the quantitative concepts of probability and average mone-
tary loss. Finally, we observe that the methods of the ISO
family do not adopt any risk analysis profile. This is due to
the fact that, according to ENISA [39], ISO 13335-2 is a
very general guideline to set up a RM framework, while ISO
17799 and ISO 27001 are actually not real methods for RM,
but rather compliance standards, reporting a list of controls
for good security practices and the requisites that an existing
method should have to be standard-compliant, respectively.
5.1.2 Applying the technique based on the QualTD model
together with other RA methods
With applying the QualTD model-based technique to an RA
method we mean carrying out some specific parts of the RA
process (i.e., definition of the ToA, BIA, risk identification,
risk evaluation and risk prioritisation) for availability risks
by using the QualTD model.
According to our classification scheme, the original RA
method followed by the Company is qualitative, based on
the business harm and Type 1with relation to the risk level
evaluation. The new RA method which integrates our tech-
nique based on the QualTD model remains qualitative, but
it is based on open damage scenarios and has a basic risk
level evaluation of Type 5. We also define a procedure to
aggregate the evaluation of incident risks per threat and vul-
nerability, making the evaluation scheme compliant to the
original Type 1.
From the perspective of the risk level scale, the QualTD
model can only be used together with a qualitative RA
method (on the other hand the TD model we proposed in
[31] can only be used with quantitative ones).
From the perspective of impact level determination, we
showed in the present case how the QualTD model is compat-
ible with methods evaluating the impact in terms of business
harm.
On the other hand, for methods adopting damage scenar-
ios, the integration with our technique is only possible if the
scenario descriptions used by the organisation undertaking
the RA can be associated with the unavailability of a node in
the dependency graph.
For methods in which the impact level is based on critical
assets, e.g., OCTAVE, the QualTD model cannot be applied
as it is, since in the current specification we do not give a
definition of critical assets. However, one possible way of
adapting the model to this purpose consists in first determin-
ing the most critical processes/services and then using the
dependency graph to find the nodes supporting those pro-
cesses/services.
We also observe that it is hard to integrate our technique
with methods based on security needs, such as EBIOS. Inne-
rhofer-Oberperfler and Breu [13] introduced an approach,
which shares some similarities with ours and is suitable to
be used in combination with these methods: we will present
this approach in more detail in Sect. 5.2.
Finally, in the present specification of the model, we do
not consider the business advantage of a certain risky factor,
as required by AS/NZS 4360: this is the only obstacle we see
for the integration of the QualTD model with this standard.
Regarding risk level evaluation, the QualTD model can be
integrated with any method adopting the Type 5 approach.
For example, our model could be used in combination with
CORAS as an additional, availability-specific, technique to
determine the consequences of threats, in substitution of the
traditional HazOp, FTA and FMECA techniques.
We showed in the present case how we integrated the
QualTD model with a Type 1 method by means of a threat
and vulnerability (aggregated) risk level definition table. We
believe that this approach is applicable in general if it is time
and information-wise feasible for the risk assessor to explic-
itly enumerate the vulnerabilities are present in the ToA.
Integration with a Type 4 is instead more challenging, as
it would require an approach similar to the one we described
previously for OCTAVE.
Finally, RAs following Type 2 and Type 3 methods
cannot be integrated with our model, due to the fact thatType
2 methods already (implicitly) take into consideration the
consequences of incident propagation in the definition of
the security needs for each asset in the ToA, while Type 3
methods are quantitative.
5.2 Dependency-based techniques for RA
Some academic researchers propose to use dependencies to
improve the quality of security RAs. They have addressed
this topic from multiple perspectives, such as information
security, business administration and software engineering.
In the literature of security RA we find three kinds of depen-
dencies: security dependencies, software dependencies and
organisational and technical/functional dependencies. In this
section we will examine previous literature on these three
fields which matches our work. Moreover, since our method
considers the third kind of dependencies, in the final part
of this section we also enumerate some techniques to build
technical/functional dependency graphs.
Security dependencies Baiardi et al. [2] propose a frame-
work for RA of information infrastructures by building a
hyper-graph of security dependencies, i.e., dependencies on
the security properties of the system: confidentiality, integrity
and availability. The dependency graph is a form of attack
graph in which nodes are the components of the infrastruc-
ture, and edges between nodes represent the dependency of a
component on some security properties of the component it
is linked to. Threats are represented as users of the infrastruc-
tures possessing some security properties on some contents,
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while vulnerabilities are conditions allowing the extension of
security rights from one component to another. The frame-
work allows one to rank countermeasures and create risk
mitigation plans. A countermeasure can reduce the vulnera-
bility level of a component, update dependencies, update the
initial properties of a threat or increase the resources needed
for an attack. Attack graph-based approaches are known to
have scalability problems (e.g., see Lippmann et al. [21]) in
terms of the number of hosts under assessment. This is due
to the fact that building such graphs requires a large amount
of work which can be only partially automated. Moreover,
they require extensive and difficult to obtain attack details:
this information was not available in the Oxygen RA and we
believe it would not be readily available in most RAs. On the
other hand, our approach is in principle less precise, but also
works when attack details are limited, as the propagation of
an availability incident is mostly dependent on the architec-
ture of the ToA, and this information is in many cases readily
available.
Software dependencies Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [10]
present a semi-quantitative approach for assessing reliability
and availability related risks at early phases of a software
life cycle by using the UML representation of the ToA. In
this work, the authors use dependencies between software
components to assess the likelihood of a fault propagating
from a component to the other. In more detail, they use the
following UML constructs: software architecture diagrams,
use case diagrams, sequence diagrams and state charts of
software components. By means of this information, they
estimate the probability of failure of a software component,
and the probability of failure of two software components
interacting with each other. They consider the complexity of
a software component in order to calculate the probability of
its failure, and the number of messages exchanged by com-
ponents to determine the probability of an interaction failure.
They give the impact of a failure in a qualitative scale rang-
ing from Minor to Catastrophic. Then, they calculate the risk
level distribution of each UML use case scenario by build-
ing a Markov model from the scenario sequence diagram.
Finally, they average all the single use case risk distributions
to determine the overall system risk. This approach, however,
is not readily applicable to all IT RAs. First, it specifically tar-
gets the assessment of risks to software components, but it is
less suitable to be used for a whole IT system which includes
not only software but also hardware, network components
and their interaction. Secondly, as threats only software and
communication failures are taken into account. In the RA of
a whole IT system one is interested in assessing incidents
caused by other threats (e.g., DoS attacks) and this approach
does not provide a way to do this. Finally, in the Oxygen case
we did not have any UML representation of the ToA and no
quantitative figures about the likelihood of threats.
Organisational and technical/functional dependencies Inne-
rhofer-Oberperfler and Breu [13] propose a model-driven
approach for assessing IT-related risks using an enterprise
architecture as the basis of the model. They group enti-
ties of the enterprise architecture in four hierarchical lay-
ers: business, application, technical and physical layer. They
derive—by refinement—business security objectives and
requirements from this enterprise architecture and from the
dependencies among its constituents. The refinement pro-
cess follows a top-down approach starting from high-level
business units to technical and physical devices. Then, they
identify and analyse risks to the security requirements by
selecting threats and vulnerabilities from standard security
methods, e.g., BSI IT-Grundshutz [40]. Once risks are iden-
tified, they do a bottom-up aggregation of risk scenarios to
make sure risks become clearly understandable at each level
of the organisation (i.e., from technical to business levels).
The approach is qualitative and not linked to a specific threat-
list, with a risk analysis technique very similar to the one
presented in the EBIOS [38] method. In our view, the strong
point of this approach is that RA is fully embedded on the
organisation at all levels, from the technical level to the busi-
ness management level. On the other hand, it imposes that
the whole organisation is aligned and has agreed on secu-
rity requirements at all levels, before the assessment can be
done. This is a strong assumption for normal enterprise or-
ganisations in which such a cooperation among the many
business units and the IT department is hardly achieved. For
example, in our case we had little information regarding the
high-level goals of the organisation and the main difficulty in
applying this method would have been deriving the full list
of security requirements from (unknown) high level goals.
Our approach on the other hand, only requires the business
owner(s) to give a relative value to the different IT services
involved in the RA, which is much easier to gather from
business-oriented people.
Kim et al. [20] propose a model to assess and prioritise
security risks and their treatment in the context of a com-
munication infrastructure. They do this by determining the
magnitude of damages produced by a threat to the assets of
the ToA, also taking into account incident propagation. To
model incident propagation, they use technical and functional
dependencies among the assets of the communication infra-
structure: for each threat they create a workflow (graph) of
the incident propagation, with the assets as nodes and the rel-
evant dependencies as edges. They annotate each edge with
the probability that the destination node is affected by the
damage on the source node. Finally, they model the vulnera-
bility level of an asset by considering the “age” of the asset.
Starting from the assumption that systems age over time, and
because of the increased level of knowledge attackers gain
on the weaknesses of the asset, attacks are supposed to have
a greater probability of success over time if the system is not
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timely patched. Using incident propagation graphs and like-
lihood distribution functions, the authors are able to calculate
the risk of an infrastructure over time, and to prioritise the
actions to be taken to control those risks. This approach is
substantially quantitative, and this makes it harder to apply
due to lack of information: the data available for Oxygen was
insufficient to estimate the level of weakness of the system
over time. Moreover, it only considers the component’s age
to determine its vulnerability level, which is limiting in many
situations. For example, according to the SLAs with the out-
sourcing company, patching is performed quite regularly on
Oxygen; therefore, the weakness (vulnerability) level of the
assets is almost constant.
Building a dependency graph Every technique using depen-
dencies for RA is based on the possibility of construct-
ing a dependency graph describing the ToA. Building the
dependency graph is an“extra” step which is not required
by traditional RA methods, as they mainly rely on the same
information but in an implicit form. For this reason, building
the dependency graph in a time-effective way is essential for
the applicability of dependency-based RAs.
A technical/functional dependency graph can be built
either manually or automatically. Manual methods involve
acquiring information by functional and technical documen-
tation and from interviews, like we did in the Oxygen RA. On
the other hand, Static Dependency Analysis [19] and Active
Dependency Discovery [4] are two automatic techniques to
automatically create the graph.
The former method is based on using application config-
uration files to derive dependencies, e.g., the web.xml file
for Java web applications. The main drawback of this method
is that it does not generate a full, cross-domain dependency
graph. This is due to the fact that some dependencies are never
derivable from a configuration file, and to the high number
of different formats configuration files can take.
The latter method consists of measuring the variation of
certain QoS parameters (e.g., availability or response time)
of the ToA after some of its components are deliberately per-
turbed. For example, by simulating a network traffic overload
it is possible to measure the dependency of the response time
of a software component with relation to the network service
it relies on.
An example of an Active Dependency Discovery tech-
nique was proposed by Bagchi et al. [1] for the availabil-
ity of e-commerce environments. The authors propose to
inject faults on the test/benchmark environment of the ToA
and detect availability dependencies; the same dependencies
are then also assumed to hold on the production system.
This technique allows one to quickly build a dependency
graph without the need to know perfectly the implementa-
tion details of the ToA. However, to build a reliable depen-
dency graph, the test/benchmark system must be identical
to the production system, which is not the case for Oxy-
gen.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduce the new QualTD model and tech-
nique for the qualitative assessment of availability risks based
on the propagation of availability incidents in an IT architec-
ture. We apply the model and technique to a real-world case
by carrying out an RA on the authentication and authorisa-
tion system of a large multinational company. We compare
the results of this RA with the ones obtained from a previous
RA carried out internally by the company on the same sys-
tem. We then evaluate the results with respect to the goals of
the stakeholders of the system.
Our results show the feasibility of the QualTD model and
technique, and indicate that the model provides better results
in terms of accuracy in terms of impact estimates and reduces
the number of subjective decisions taken by the risk asses-
sor. The reasons of success are mainly due to the system-
atic nature of the approach and to the completeness of the
information the model includes. These factors help the risk
assessor to deal with the complexity of the ToA in such a
way that no relevant risk factor is neglected. Our analysis
also shows that the QualTD model is particularly suitable to
assess the availability risks of IT infrastructures or parts of
them, when RAs are carried out regularly on the same target
and when the final results of the RA are used to prioritise the
risk mitigation strategies.
In addition, we analyse 12 RA standard methods, and we
discuss which characteristics of the standard methods are
compatible with the QualTD model-based technique. Our
analysis shows that the QualTD model can be used in combi-
nation with many of the most popular RA standard methods.
This indicates a wide range of applicability of the technique,
also in organisations not using the same RA method we used
in this case.
Finally, we make a review of academic works we found
in the literature which apply dependency analysis to RA.
We show the type of risk analysis these techniques allow
and we discuss their applicability to our real-world case.
Our analysis shows that none of the techniques exam-
ined are directly applicable to our case either because
they require information that was not readily available, or
because they cannot satisfy the requirements of the stake-
holders.
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